DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                     BCMR Docket No. 2007-144 
 
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FINAL DECISION 

 

 
 

 

 

 

This is a proceeding under the provisions of section 1552 of title 10 and section 425 of 
title 14 of the United States Code.  The Chair docketed the case on June 20, 2007, upon receipt 
of  the  applicant’s  completed  application,  and  assigned  it  to  staff  member  J.  Andrews  to  pre-
pare the decision for the Board as required by 33 C.F.R. § 52.61(c). 
 
 
appointed members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This  final  decision,  dated  April  30,  2008,  is  approved  and  signed  by  the  three  duly 

APPLICANT’S REQUEST AND ALLEGATIONS  

The applicant asked the Board to correct his military record by upgrading his 1975 dis-
charge  under  other  than  honorable  conditions  to  an  honorable  discharge.    He  stated  that  his 
discharge should be upgraded because his “time in the Coast Guard was served and I had com-
pleted whatever discipline associated with any previous reprimand.”  The applicant argued that 
the Board should find that it is in the interest of justice to waive the three-year statute of limita-
tions for his application because in 1975 he “was young and did not think the status could pre-
vent me [from having] a good life.  I did not, however, realize the long-term implications, such 
as ineligibility for VA medical services.” 
 

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD 

On April 10, 1970, at the age of 18, the applicant enlisted in the Coast Guard for four 
years, through April 9, 1974.  He is African-American.  Upon completing boot camp on June 12, 
1970, he was advanced to fireman apprentice (E-2) and assigned to a cutter based in Honolulu, 
Hawaii.  On October 16, 1970, the applicant was awarded non-judicial punishment (NJP) for an 
unauthorized absence of less than one day.  He was awarded fourteen days’ restriction and extra 
duty and reduction to pay grade (E-1), but the reduction in pay grade was suspended and then 
remitted.  On November 1, 1971, the applicant advanced to fireman (E-3).  

 

 
On April 10, 1973, the applicant re-advanced to fireman (E-3).  On May 2, 1973, he was 
awarded NJP of seven days’ extra duty for insubordinate conduct occurring on April 30, 1973.  
On June 2, 1973, the applicant was transferred to the Port Safety Station in Houston, Texas. 

 
On January 1, 1974, the applicant, who was 22 years old, was on duty making security 
rounds at the station when he got into an argument with his roommate SN R.1  The duty master-
at-arms (MAA), a first class petty officer, found the applicant brandishing a knife at SN R and 
threatening to “cut” him.  The MAA ordered the applicant to put away the knife several times, 
but he refused to do so.  The MAA then sought assistance from the Office of the Day (OOD), an 
ensign.  While the MAA was explaining the situation to the OOD, the applicant interrupted them.  
When the MAA “made some comment that was offensive,” the applicant brandished his knife 
and stepped toward the MAA.  The OOD tried to stop the applicant by grabbing his arm but real-
ized he could not overpower him and so released his arm.  The applicant then brandished his 
knife at the OOD  and “made an obscene comment challenging [them] to take the knife  away 
from him.”  When another first class petty officer (PO1) arrived, the applicant walked toward 
him brandishing the knife.  The PO1 pulled a pistol and invited the applicant to “come on.”  The 
applicant then tossed his knife away, and it was confiscated by the OOD.  The OOD took the 
applicant to his quarters, where the applicant told him that the incident started because he was 
trying  to  keep  his  friend,  SN  R,  from  going AWOL  and  that  by  intervening  and  ordering  the 
applicant  to  put  his  knife  away,  the  MAA  “had  been  intruding  on  a  private  matter”  between 
friends.  Ten minutes later, the OOD thought that the applicant had calmed down, returned his 
knife to him, and told him to continue his security rounds.  However, fifteen minutes later, the 
OOD found the applicant in possession of a handgun.  The applicant told the OOD that he had 
gotten the gun for his own protection.  The OOD took the gun and told the applicant to continue 
his rounds without causing more trouble. 

On April 12, 1972, the applicant was transferred to a cutter based in Morgan City, Louisi-
ana, his home state.  On July 24, 1972, the applicant was absent without leave (AWOL), and he 
remained so for twenty-four days until August 17, 1972.  On September 25, 1972, he was tried 
by summary court-martial for his unauthorized absence of twenty-four days.  He was sentenced 
to reduction to E-2; forfeiture of $200.00 for one month; and restriction to the cutter at hard labor 
for thirty days.  The sentence was approved by the convening authority on October 21, 1972. 

 
On February 10, 1974, the applicant went AWOL.  He was declared a deserter on March 
11, 1974.  On May 22, 1974, he was apprehended at his mother’s home in Kenner, Louisiana, by 
Coast Guard agents, taken back to Houston, and placed in pre-trial confinement. 

 
On June 7, 1974, the applicant was tried by special court-martial for numerous offenses 
against the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).  He was represented by a military attorney 
throughout  the  proceedings.   The  charges  included  violations  of Article  90,  by  lifting  a  knife 
against an ensign who was then in execution of his office; Article 91, by assaulting a first class 
petty officer by approaching him with a knife and slashing it at him and by assaulting another 
first class petty officer by approaching him with a knife and “offering to do grievous bodily harm 
to him”; and Article 92, by possessing a handgun at his station without authorization.  In addi-
                                                 
1 This account of the events of January 1, 1974, is taken from the August 28, 1975, summary of the testimony at trial 
prepared by the  Chief of the Office of Personnel for the Commandant’s clemency review. 

tion, the applicant was charged with violating Article 85 by being AWOL with intent to desert 
from February 10, 1974, to May 22, 1974; and Article 128, by striking a fellow confinee with a 
metal  pipe  on June  11, 1974,  and  “inflict[ing]  grievous  bodily  harm  upon  him,  to  wit:  severe 
bruises to his arm and body” so that he required treatment in a hospital emergency room.  

 
At trial, the applicant pled not guilty.  Following the testimony of twelve witnesses, how-
ever, he was found guilty on June 28, 1974, of all but two of the charges, and for those two he 
was found guilty of the lesser included offenses of simple assault and assault consummated by 
battery.  His sentence was 

 

 

• 
• 
• 
• 

to be discharged from the Coast Guard with a bad conduct discharge (BCD); 
to be confined at hard labor for four months; 
to forfeit $210.00 per month for four months; and 
to be reduced to seaman recruit, pay grade E-1.  

On October 4, 1974, the Convening Authority, who was the Commanding Officer (CO) 
of the Port Safety Station, approved the sentence awarded by the special court-martial but sus-
pended the execution of the BCD “for the period of confinement and six months thereafter, at 
which time, unless the suspension is sooner vacated, the bad conduct discharge shall be remitted 
without further action.”   

 
On  October  10,  1974,  the  applicant  completed  his  period  of  confinement  and  was 
returned to the Port Safety Station in Houston for duty.  However, he went AWOL from October 
20 to 23, 1974, and failed to report for duty on time on October 24, 1974.  On November 18, 
1974 the applicant went AWOL again and did not return to the station until December 5, 1974. 

 
On December 16, 1974, an investigating officer reported to the CO about events that had 
occurred  on  December  9  and  10,  1974.    The  report  indicates  that  on  December  9,  1974,  the 
executive officer (XO) ordered the applicant and his friend, SN R, to move to separate rooms by 
the end of the day because their room was in “severe disarray,” they had repeatedly failed to 
meet  barracks  cleanliness  standards,  and  there  were  unauthorized  alcoholic  beverages  in  their 
room.  Although SN R eventually complied and moved his things to another room on December 
10, 1974, the applicant repeatedly refused to move his things, threatened petty officers with a 
bamboo pole, and fought with petty officers who were sent to move his things for him.  The 
applicant also took something from his locker, hid it in his jacket, and told the petty officers that 
if  they  touched  his  things  he  would  get  a  gun  and  someone  would  get  hurt.    When  the  XO 
ordered that the applicant be confined to his room until the CO returned that afternoon, the appli-
cant struck the chief petty officer assigned to enforce the order and left the room.  The applicant 
was then left alone until the CO arrived in the afternoon.  The CO heard the applicant’s com-
plaint about having to change rooms and ordered him to obey the order to change rooms.  

 
On  December  17,  1974,  the  CO  convened  a  hearing  to  determine  whether  he  should 
vacate the suspension of the BCD based on the applicant’s violation of the terms of his probation 
by his two unauthorized absences from October 20 to 23, 1974, and November 18 to December 
5,  1974;  and  by  his  willful  disobedience  of  a  lawful  order  on  December  10,  1974.    After  the 

hearing, the CO recommended that the suspension be vacated and that the applicant be sent home 
to await the completion of the court-martial proceedings.   

 
On  January  16,  1975,  the  applicant  was  sent  home  in  a  leave  without  pay  status.    On 
January  27,  1975,  the  Officer  Exercising  General  Court-Martial  Jurisdiction  (OEGCMJ),  who 
was  the  Eighth  District  Commander,  approved  the  sentence  along  with  the  suspension  of  the 
BCD.  On March 27, 1975, the OECGMJ approved the vacation of the suspension of the BCD, 
as well as the execution of the BCD once the appellate review was complete. 

 
 
On May 5, 1975, the Court of Military Review affirmed the findings of guilty, with one 
exception concerning a lesser included offense, and found the sentence appropriate.  On July 21, 
1975,  the  OEGCMJ  served  notice  on  the  applicant  of  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Military 
Review and of his right to petition the U.S. Court of Military Appeals for review within thirty 
days.  The applicant did not submit an appeal. 
 
 
On August 28, 1975, the Chief of the Office of Personnel wrote a memorandum to the 
Commandant pursuant to his clemency review.  He stated that according to the applicant’s testi-
mony  at  trial,  the  applicant  had  “encountered  racial  discrimination  both  on  and  off  the  ship” 
when he was assigned to the cutter in Morgan City, Louisiana, from April 1972 to June 1973.  
The applicant testified that he went AWOL from the cutter for twenty-four days in 1972 because 
he  was  afraid  of  racist  crewmates  and  could  not  get  transferred.    He  further  testified  that  his 
actions on January 1, 1974, resulted from a build-up of stress and “overpowering rage” due to 
racial discrimination.  The Chief of the Office of Personnel concluded that the applicant’s testi-
mony of racism and tension was credible but that his offenses on January 1, 1974, were very 
serious and not justified.  He noted that the CO had given the applicant a chance to redeem him-
self by suspending the BCD, but that the applicant violated the terms of his probation soon after 
being released from confinement.  He stated that “there are no grounds to justify a grant of clem-
ency in this case” and recommended the execution of the BCD. 
 
 
On September 5, 1975, the Commandant denied clemency and approved the execution of 
the applicant’s BCD.  On September 12, 1975, the BCD was executed.  The applicant’s DD 214 
states that he was discharged “under other than honorable conditions.” 
 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
 
On November 6, 2007, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) submitted an advisory opinion 
in which he adopted the findings and analysis provided in a memorandum on the case prepared 
by the Coast Guard Personnel Command (CGPC).  CGPC recommended that the Board deny the 
requested relief because of the application’s untimeliness and lack of merit.   
 
 
CGPC  stated  that  even  if  the  Board  waives  the  statute  of  limitations,  relief  should  be 
denied because a “complete review of the applicant’s record does not reveal an error or injustice 
with  regards  to  his  processing  for  separation.”    CGPC  stated  that  the  applicant’s  bad  conduct 
discharge  was  part  of  his  sentence  upon  conviction  of  several  serious  offenses  and  that  the 
Commandant  denied  clemency  upon  review  and  ordered  that  the  BCD  be  executed.    CGPC 
stated that the BCD was “just and commensurate … with the nature of the applicant’s offenses. 

… There is no justification for upgrading his character of service.”  CGPC submitted copies of 
several documents from the applicant’s military record, including the August 28, 1975, clemency 
memorandum recounting the applicant’s offenses and testimony about racial tension. 
 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
 
On November 13, 2007, the Chair sent the applicant a copy of the advisory opinion and 
invited him to respond within thirty days.  After being granted an extension, the applicant sub-
mitted his response on January 29, 2008. 
 
 
The applicant apologized for his actions and asked for the Board’s “compassion to over-
turn the conditions of my discharge and restore my honor. … I simply lacked the understanding 
of the impact my actions would have on my entire life.”  He pointed that that he “had a near per-
fect service career,” except for what happened at the end, and stated that his discharge has caused 
him great hardship both economically and psychologically.  The applicant stated that at the time 
of his offenses, he 
 

was very young.  I voluntarily enlisted and … was not able to handle the constant racial adversity.  
With one altercation, others became involved that were not part of the original incident, [and] then 
I was returned to the same unit, with the same continuing issues.  Even though I was given the 
opportunity  to  “straighten  up”  my  act,  I  could  not  perform  in  that  environment.    The  previous 
handling of my case, in my mind, was a “no-win” situation and all that was on my mind was “get-
ting out.” … I am truly sorry for the pain and anguish that my behavior caused and am very grate-
ful  that  no  one  was  injured  badly  due  to  my  actions.    I  have  suffered  terribly  over  the  years 
because of the status of my discharge and ask humbly for the reconsideration of the Board.  Please 
restore my honor. 
 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

 
2. 

 
3. 

The Board makes the following findings and conclusions on the basis of the applicant's 

 
 
military record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and applicable law: 
 

1. 

The Board has jurisdiction concerning this matter pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) 
and  (f)(2),  which  authorize  the  Board  to  take  “action  on  the  sentence  of  a  court-martial  for 
purposes of clemency.” 

Under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b), an application to the Board must be filed within three 
years  after  the  applicant  discovers  the  alleged  error  in  his  record.   The  applicant  received  his 
BCD on September 12, 1975.  Thus, the application was untimely.   

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b), the  Board may  excuse the untimeliness of an 
application if it is in the interest of justice to do so.  In Allen v. Card, 799 F. Supp. 158, 164 
(D.D.C. 1992), the court stated that to determine whether the interest of justice supports a waiver 
of the statute of limitations, the Board “should analyze both the reasons for the delay and the 
potential merits of the claim based on a cursory review.”  The court further instructed that “the 

longer the delay has been and the weaker the reasons are for the delay, the more compelling the 
merits would need to be to justify a full review.”2   

The applicant’s explanation for his long delay in applying for relief is not compel-
ling.  Although he attributes the delay to his youth, he was twenty-four years old on the date of 
his discharge and is now more than fifty-five years old.  Likewise, his ineligibility for medical 
benefits from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) is not a compelling reason to excuse his 
long delay. 

The applicant argued that his discharge should be upgraded (a) because he was 
young at the time, (b) because the BCD makes  him ineligible for DVA  medical benefits, and  
(c) because his “time in the Coast Guard was served and I had completed whatever discipline 
associated with any previous reprimand.”  The Board will address these arguments in order: 

  
4. 

 
5. 

 

 

(a)  The applicant was 22 years old on January 1, 1974, when he committed the 
offenses for which he was tried and sentenced, and 23 years old in late 1974, when he violated 
his probation and thus had the suspension of the BCD vacated.  The Board finds that his age at 
the time of the offenses is not an excuse or a reason to upgrade his discharge since a 22- or 23-
year-old man should take responsibility for his own conduct.   

 
(b)  The applicant’s ineligibility for DVA medical benefits results from the char-
acter of his discharge.  Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d), the DVA normally denies benefits to those 
discharged under other than honorable conditions.  The Board finds that the applicant’s ineligi-
bility for benefits from the DVA is not grounds for upgrading his BCD. 

 
(c)  Prior to January 1, 1974, the applicant had been punished twice at mast and 
once by a summary court-martial following a 24-day unauthorized absence.  The applicant’s spe-
cial  court-martial  sentence  of  June  28,  1974,  consisted  of  four  parts:  (1)  confinement  at  hard 
labor for four months; (2) forfeiture of $210.00 per month for four months; (3) reduction to pay 
grade E-1; and (4) the BCD.  The record shows that the applicant completed the first three of 
these and that the Convening Authority tried to mitigate the sentence by suspending the fourth 
part—the  execution  of  the  BCD—for  a  six-month  probationary  period  following  his  confine-
ment.  Therefore, if the applicant had served satisfactorily during the six months following his 
release from confinement on October 10, 1974, he would not have received the BCD.  However, 
he went AWOL within days of his release from confinement, went AWOL again a month later, 
and on December 10, 1974, committed numerous additional offenses by refusing to obey orders 
and threatening and assaulting petty officers sent by the XO to enforce the orders.  The Com-
mandant later denied clemency based upon the gravity of the applicant’s offenses although he 
took into account the applicant’s testimony at trial about feeling overwhelming rage following a 
build-up of tension due to racism.  Given that the BCD was part of the applicant’s sentence and 
was only executed after he had violated his probation by committing numerous other offenses, 
the Board finds that the applicant’s prior offenses and punishments and his completion of the 
first three parts of his special court-martial sentence are not grounds for upgrading his BCD. 

                                                 
2 Allen v. Card, 799 F. Supp. 158, 164-65 (D.D.C. 1992); see also Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396 
(D.C. Cir. 1995). 

6. 

The record shows that the applicant was represented by an attorney throughout the 
proceedings, that he received all due process, and that the Coast Guard committed no error in 
separating him with a BCD.  However, under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a), the Board may “remove an 
injustice”  from  a  veteran’s  record,  as  well  as  correct  an  error  in  the  record.    The  Board  has 
authority  to  determine  whether  an  injustice  exists  on  a  case  by  case  basis.3    Therefore,  the 
Board’s review should consider whether the applicant’s BCD now constitutes an injustice.  With 
respect  to  upgrading  discharges,  the  General  Counsel  of  the  Department  of  Transportation 
informed  the  BCMR  on  July  7,  1976,  that  it  should  not  upgrade  a  discharge  based  on  post-
discharge conduct alone and “should not upgrade a discharge unless it is convinced, after having 
considered all the evidence … that in light of today’s standards the discharge was disproportion-
ately severe vis-à-vis the conduct in response to which it was imposed.”  The applicant has not 
proved either that his post-discharge conduct merits an upgrade or that his BCD was dispropor-
tionately severe in light of today’s standards.4  The Board does not, however, construe the 1976 
guidance  as  prohibiting  it  from  exercising  clemency  in  court-martial  cases  under  10  U.S.C. 
§ 1552(f),5 even if the discharge was not disproportionately severe in light of today’s standards.  
Such a construction would be inconsistent with the nature of “clemency,” which means “kind-
ness, mercy, leniency.”6   Clemency does not necessarily require that a sentence have been unjust 
or wrong; on the contrary, it can be (and often is) forgiveness of punishment that is otherwise 
appropriate.  An analysis under the 1976 guidance primarily considers whether the past discharge 
was unjust at the time or would be unjust if applied to a similarly situated servicemember today; 
a clemency analysis considers, instead, whether it is appropriate today to forgive the past offense 
that led to the punishment and to mitigate the punishment accordingly. 

 
7. 

In the aftermath of World War II, this Board denied most applicants’ requests to 
upgrade BCDs absent evidence of procedural errors or psychiatric illness.7  However, in more 
                                                 
3 Decision of the Deputy General Counsel, BCMR Docket No. 2001-043. According to Sawyer v. United States, 18 
Cl. Ct. 860, 868 (1989), rev’d on other grounds, 930 F.2d 1577, and Reale v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 1010, 1011 
(1976), purposes of the BCMRs under 10 U.S.C. § 1552, “injustice” is “treatment by military authorities that shocks 
the sense of justice.” 
4  In  fact,  under  the  sentencing  guidelines  of  the  UCMJ,  the  applicant  would  likely  receive  a  BCD  if  he  were 
convicted of the same offenses today. 
5 Under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(f), the Board has authority to take “action on the sentence of a court-martial for purposes 
of clemency.” 
6 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed.) 
7 For examples of BCDs upgraded to general discharges based on procedural errors or psychiatric illness, see BCMR 
Docket Nos. 11, 12, 13, 20, 41, 63, 71, 76, 109, 132, 143, 145, 157, and 212.  For examples of BCDs not upgraded 
by the BCMR, see Docket No. 9 (found guilty at GCM of being AOL for 6 days; released from confinement after 3 
months;  violated probation by being  AWOL  for 5 days;  BCD executed); No. 15 (found guilty at GCM of being 
AOL  for 3 days and  missing ship’s  movement; released from confinement after 3  months; violated probation by 
falling asleep while on duty; BCD executed); No. 52 (found guilty at GCM of being AOL for 19 days; released from 
confinement after 5 months; violated probation by being AWOL for 3 days; BCD executed); No. 68 (found guilty at 
GCM  of  being  AOL  for  7  days  and  missing  ship’s  movement;  released  after  5  months;  chose  BCD  rather  than 
probationary period);  No. 107 (found guilty at GCM of being AOL for 42 days; released from confinement after 4 
months; violated probation by being AWOL for 6 days; reconfined for 4 months; BCD executed); No. 116 (found 
guilty at GCM of being AWOL for 29 days; restored to duty on probation; violated probation by being AWOL for 
11 days; BCD executed); No. 135 (found guilty at GCM of being AOL for 13 days and missing ship’s movement; 
released  from  confinement  after  5  months;  violated  probation  by  disorderly  conduct;  BCD  executed);  No.  147 
(found guilty at GCM of being AOL for 17 days and missing ship’s movement; released from confinement after 4 
months; violated probation by “petty offenses”; BCD executed); No. 213 (found guilty at GCM of being AOL for 8 

recent years, the Board has granted clemency by upgrading BCDs to General discharges when 
applicants were teenagers at the time of their offenses; when their offenses under the UCMJ were 
essentially absence offenses, such as being AWOL or missing ship’s movement, or they com-
mitted  only  one  major  offense;  when  they  have  borne  the  burden  of  their  bad  discharges  for 
many years; and when their post-discharge conduct has been satisfactory.8  Although the appli-
cant  in  this  case  has  borne  the  burden  of  his  BCD  for  many  years  and  although  at  trial  he 
attributed his conduct on January 1, 1974—when the MAA tried to stop him from assaulting his 
friend,  SN  R,  with  a  knife—to  rage  that  built  up  inside  him  due  to  racism,  the  Board  finds 
insufficient basis in the record for granting clemency given that he was not a teenager when he 
committed the offenses; he committed several major offenses including assaults with dangerous 
weapons and one battery inflicting grievous bodily harm; and he has submitted nothing to show 
that his conduct following his discharge from the Coast Guard has been satisfactory.   
 

Accordingly, the Board finds that it is not in the interest of justice to waive the 

8. 

 

statute of limitations and that the applicant’s request should be denied. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
days and missing ship’s movement; released from confinement on probation; violated probation by being AOL for 4 
days); No. 250 (found guilty  at GCM of being  AWOL  for 11 days and  missing  ship’s  movement; released  from 
confinement after 3 months; violated probation by being AOL for 4 days); No. 283 (found guilty at GCM of being 
AOL for 15 days and missing ship’s movement; released after 5 months’ confinement; violated probation). 
8 See, e.g, BCMR Docket No. 2005-107, in which the Board upgraded a BCD to a General discharge because the 
applicant was a teenager at the time of his offenses during World War II; because his offenses included only the 29-
day unauthorized absence for which he was sentenced by a GCM, an attempted escape, and the 4-day unauthorized 
absence during his post-confinement probationary period that led to the execution of the BCD; because the applicant 
was not represented by counsel and received significantly less due process than defendants do today; and because 
the sentence was likely more severe than the punishment that might be meted out today for similar misconduct.  For 
older  examples  of  BCDs  upgraded  to  general  discharges,  see  BCMR  Docket  No.  30  (3  deck  courts  for  minor 
offenses; one GCM for being AWOL 44 days); No. 42 (1 mast for being AWOL 2 days; one GCM for being AWOL 
28 days; upgraded on basis of youth (age at enlistment), one major offense, and 14 months of sea duty); No. 43 (1 
mast for being AOL 2 days; 2 deck courts for being AOL 2 days and 6 days; one GCM for being AOL 10 days; 
violation of probation after 7 months of confinement by being AOL 11 days; upgraded on basis of extensive sea 
service “in Northern waters” and 7 months of confinement); No. 76 (2 masts for intoxication and for being AOL 4 
hours;  1  GCM  for  being  AWOL  for  3  days  and  missing  ship’s  movement;  upgraded  on  basis  of  youth,  possible 
battle  fatigue,  and  extensive  sea  duty  in  the  Pacific);  No.  88  (1  GCM  for  being  AWOL  80  days;  violation  of 
probation by being AOL 1 day; upgraded on basis of 6 months of confinement and one major offense following a 
year of sea duty); No. 93 (2 deck courts for being AOL 5 and 6 days; civil trial for petty larceny; 1 GCM for being 
AOL 15 days; upgraded on basis of 5 months of confinement and “us[ing] his AOL for a worthwhile purpose”); No. 
100 (1 GCM for being AOL 42 days; upgraded on basis of 17 months of combat duty in Pacific, one major offense, 
and no probationary period); No. 127 (1 mast for being AOL 18.5 hours; 3 deck courts for disobedience; 1 GCM for 
disobedience  and  conduct  to  the  prejudice  of  good  order;  upgraded  on  basis  of  youth,  inexperience,  and  lack  of 
probationary period); No. 128 (1 GCM for throwing a wad of paper at an officer and threatening to kill 2 officers 
after one of them used a racial slur during a group lecture; upgraded because “clemency is justifiable”); No. 132 (1 
GCM for being AOL 6 days and missing ship’s movement; upgraded on basis of immaturity and only one offense); 
No. 165 (2 masts for being AOL 6 hours and 2 days; 1 deck court for being AOL 7 days; 1 GCM for being AOL 9 
days and  missing ship’s  movement; sentenced to reduction to SA, confinement  for 3.5 years, and BCD; released 
after 4 months but violated probation by going AOL); No. 196 (1 SCM for being AOL 26 days; 1 GCM for being 
AOL  28  days;  upgraded  because  absences  were  spent  working  on  family  farm  after  father  was  injured  in  car 
accident); No. 217 (1 GCM for being AOL and missing ship’s movement; sentenced to 6 months at hard labor and 
BCD; released after 3 months but violated probation by being AOL); No. 264 (2 masts; 1 SCM; 1 GCM for being 
AOL 20 days and missing ship’s movement; 2 masts while in confinement for yelling “racial discrimination”; no 
probationary period). 

military record is denied.   

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
 Bruce D. Burkley 

 

 

 
 Randall J. Kaplan 

 

 

 
 James E. McLeod 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The  application  of  former  SR  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,  USCG,  for  correction  of  his 

ORDER